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[Excerpt] Concern that structural factors impede efficient labor market performance is evidenced in both 
statistical analyses of economic potential and policy proposals for selective employment subsidies. 
Estimates of the level and expected growth of full-employment GNP have recently been revised 
downward, as has the 3.2 unemployment multiplier implicit in Okun's Law (see U.S. Council of Economic 
Advisers and George Perry). These indications of structural changes in labor markets reinforce statistics 
showing excessively high unemployment rates for youths and blacks, and labor force participation rates 
that are increasing for women and decreasing for men. 
The simultaneous concern with high inflation and high measured unemployment, in the context of major 
changes in labor force composition and increased variance in sectoral unemployment rates (see Perry), 
has brought forth numerous and sizable selective employment subsidy policies (SESP) in both the United 
States and Western Europe. The SESP, changes in potential GNP, and Okun's Law are not unrelated 
phenomena. This paper explores that relationship. Section I presents a brief taxonomy of the primary 
SESPs which are currently being discussed in Western industrialized countries. Section II provides the 
economic rationale underlying these measures. Section III explores the relationship of SESP to the 
prospective growth of aggregate output, in the context of Okun's Law. Evidence on the existence and 
magnitude of changes in employment decisions in response to the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) is 
presented in Section IV. 
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Selective Employment Subsidies: 
Can Okun’s Law Be Repealed? 
By JOHN BISHOP and ROBERT HAVEMAN 
Concern that structural factors impede efficient labor market performance is evi-
denced in both statistical analyses of economic potential and policy proposals for 
selective employment subsidies. Estimates of the level and expected growth of full-
employment GNP have recently been revised downward, as has the 3.2 unemployment 
multiplier implicit in Okun's Law (see U.S. Council of Economic Advisers and George 
Perry). These indications of structural changes in labor markets reinforce statistics 
showing excessively high unemployment rates for youths and blacks, and labor force 
participation rates that are increasing for women and decreasing for men. 
The simultaneous concern with high inflation and high measured unemployment, 
in the context of major changes in labor force composition and increased variance in sec-
toral unemployment rates (see Perry), has brought forth numerous and sizable selective 
employment subsidy policies (SESP) in both the United States and Western Europe. The 
SESP, changes in potential GNP, and Okun's Law are not unrelated phenomena. This 
paper explores that relationship. Section I presents a brief taxonomy of the primary 
SESPs which are currently being discussed in Western industrialized countries. Section II 
provides the economic rationale underlying these measures. Section III explores the rela-
tionship of SESP to the prospective growth of aggregate output, in the context of Okun's 
Law. Evidence on the existence and magnitude of changes in employment decisions in 
response to the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) is presented in Section IV. 
I 
Wage (or employment) subsidies have been the primary measure designed to 
target employment demands on those sectors with substantial excess supply. They have 
appeared in various guises. A SESP can be a function of recruitment (additional hires), 
the existing employment stock, or changes in the employment stock. Each of these 
subsidies can be targeted on particular types of labor (say, by age, sex, region, 
unemployment duration, or education), or they can be general in nature. Moreover, the 
subsidy can be a flat amount or it can vary with the level of earnings, the wage rate, or 
the duration of coverage. It can be paid to the employer or to the worker, either directly 
or via a tax credit. 
Examples of several of these variants have been recently implemented (see 
Haveman and G. B. Christainsen). The United States' NJTC is a constrained marginal 
stock subsidy with no targeting. In calendar years 1977 and 1978 firms expanding 
employment above 102 percent of the previous year's employment level receive a tax 
credit equal to 50 percent of the first $4,200 of wages paid each additional employee up 
to a maximum of 47 employees or $100,000 of credit. On the other hand, the 1975 British 
Temporary Employment Subsidy is a reverse recruitment rather than a stock subsidy, and 
like the NJTC it is temporary and nontargeted. This program subsidizes about 30 percent 
of the wage costs for up to one year of workers who would otherwise be laid off. In 1974, 
the West German government introduced a temporary targeted recruitment subsidy with a 
marginal stock constraint. For six months, a wage subsidy of 60 percent was paid to firms 
in specified regions for employing registered unemployed workers, if the firm's 
employment increased from that of a stipulated date prior to passage of the act. 
The Netherlands, France, and Sweden have also recently adopted targeted 
employment subsidies. The percentage of the labor force on which SESP-type subsidies 
are paid varies from about .3 percent of the labor force in West Germany to 3-4 percent in 
Sweden. In 1978, the NJTC will be paid on the employment of nearly 1 percent of the 
U.S. labor force at a total budget cost of at least $2 billion. 
While few reliable evaluations have been made of these SESPs, the numerous 
extensions of what were to be temporary programs suggest that they have not been 
viewed as failures in achieving the primary objective-employment increases set for them. 
In the United States, the Carter Administration has proposed replacing the lapsing NJTC 
with a Targeted Employment Tax Credit that would subsidize firms for 33 percent of the 
first $6,000 of first-year wages paid to low-income workers who are either 18-24 years of 
age or handicapped, and for 25 percent in the second year. As revised in Congress, the 
proposal will likely become a hiring subsidy rather than a stock subsidy, and the target 
group will be expanded to include welfare recipients. 
II 
The economic rationale for SESP is straightforward: By reducing the price of 
labor at the margin, employment will be encouraged, unemployment reduced, price 
pressure will be reduced in competitive markets through a reduction in the marginal cost 
function for incremental output and, in the case of marginal stock subsidies, entry will be 
encouraged. Further, for firms engaged in external trade, SESP operates as an export 
subsidy (see Layard and Nickell). Indeed, for a number of Western European nations, this 
characteristic is viewed as a primary rationale for SESP. A temporary SESP encourages 
firms to incur labor costs earlier than otherwise. As a result, inventory accumulation or 
accelerated maintenance and investment spending will tend to increase. Finally, SESP 
(particularly nontemporary programs) will tend to induce the substitution of targeted 
labor for nontargeted labor. For example, it may induce adding a second shift rather than 
increasing overtime (see Jonathan Kesselman, Samuel Williamson, and Ernst Berndt). 
Inevitably, however, the net job creation impact of a SESP - defined as the 
employment level in the economy with the policy less that without it will, because of 
financial, output, and labor market displacements, be smaller than the gross number of 
jobs subsidized. A fully specified general equilibrium model is necessary to accurately 
estimate the net effects of a SESP. 
If SESP is targeted on a resource in excess supply or with a positive and nontrivial 
supply elasticity (such as handicapped workers, transfer program recipients, and low-
income youth (see Stanley Masters and Irwin Garfinkel)), potential GNP defined as the 
level of GNP when NAIRU (the rate of unemployment that does not accelerate inflation) 
is attained will rise. Even if the labor markets for these workers were free from 
distortions associated with minimum wage and tax and transfer programs, a wage subsidy 
of their employment paid for by a tax on other workers would raise potential GNP (see 
Bishop, 1977). Indeed, SESP can also increase potential GNP even if the labor force 
participation rate of each demographic group is fixed by reducing a wage-weighted 
NAIRU through concentrating employment increases on sectors with elastic sectoral 
Phillips curves (see Martin Baily and James Tobin). 
The benefits of expanding potential GNP in this manner are increased by the fact 
that the labor supply decisions of targeted groups are distorted by high employer- and 
employee-paid taxes, and even higher marginal reduction rates of transfer benefits. 
Consequently, any resulting increase in actual and potential GNP through such 
employment increases will be positively correlated with the change in economic welfare. 
Moreover, pecuniary externalities for taxpayers are created by the increase in tax 
revenues and the decrease in transfer costs associated with SESP, both of which reduce 
the net budgetary cost of the program. 
Further a subsidy of one of the major costs of doing business will exercise 
downward pressure on prices during the transition to a new price level. This temporary 
reduction in inflationary pressure may feed back into inflationary expectations, and have 
a longer-run impact on price inflation. 
In addition to its effects on actual and potential GNP and prices, SESP will tend to 
shift the composition of employment and earnings toward low-skill, target-group work-
ers. If less inequality in the distribution of the adverse effects of poor economic 
performance is desired, this is a major benefit of SESP. One consequence of this 
redistribution is that, even with a constant GNP, the number of employed persons will 
increase as low-productivity workers are substituted for those with higher skills. 
III 
Because of these likely effects of SESP, the macroeconomic relationships 
between changes in GNP, the GNP gap, and the unemployment rate will be altered. In 
standard policy models, increases in aggregate demand are viewed as closing the gap by 
increasing actual GNP toward some exogenously determined full-employment GNP. 
However, as indicated above, SESP is likely to increase simultaneously both the actual 
and a NAIRU-based potential GNP. Hence, a SESP-induced increase in GNP will reduce 
the conventionally measured GNP gap by more than it reduces the true gap. The SESP 
will also alter the relationship between the measured GNP gap and the unemployment 
rate. A SESP-induced increase in GNP will tend to be associated with a larger increase 
(decrease) in employment (unemployment) than is typically associated with general 
aggregate demand-induced changes in GNP. 
Consider the following accounting relationship between GNP, productivity (A), 
employed capital (K), hours worked per week (H), and labor force participation rate (L): 
(1) dGNP = dA + (I -BL) dK + BL(dH + SndL - SndU) 
where dx indicates the percentage rate of change of x, U = -100 log(employment/labor 
force) the unemployment rate, BL is the share of labor, and Sn is the ratio of the skill 
level of newly employed workers to the economy-wide average. Okun's Law is a reduced 
form of (1) which states that a I percentage point cyclical change in U is associated with a 
3.2 percent change in GNP. While a percentage point decrease in U is directly associated 
in (1) with an increase in GNP equal to BLSn (approximately .7 of a percentage point), 
cyclical changes in other determinants of GNP namely, L, H, K, and A are negatively 
associated with U. It is the sum of these effects that makes up the difference between .7 
and 3.2. 
There are at least three reasons why a 1 percentage point change in U induced by 
a SESP is not likely to increase GNP by 3.2 percentage points. First, a SESP-induced 
reduction in U will shift the composition of employment toward workers with Sn < 1 and 
increase the training costs of the firm. The inevitable result of such substitution is to 
reduce measured productivity, at least in the short run, and Sn and |dA/dU| will fall as 
these costs are recorded in firm accounts. 
Second, SESP encourages the hiring of part-time workers (especially if the per 
worker subsidized earnings level is capped) or the substitution of additional workers for 
increased overtime of existing workers. As a result, the response of H to changes in U 
will be smaller than otherwise - |dH/dU| will fall. 
Third, to the extent that target group labor is not complementary with capital 
services, as is likely, the utilization of capital will not increase as much as in the case of 
an equivalent general demand stimulus - |dH/dU| will fall. 
Finally, because of the limited knowledge on behavioral responses, the effect of 
SESP on |dH/dU| is unknown. On the one hand, target group workers form a high 
proportion of the discouraged worker, nonlabor force participant category. On the other 
hand, SESP may not generate as large an increase in labor force participation as an 
equivalent reduction in U stimulated by a general expansion in demand. 
Thus, at least during the period of adjustment following enactment of a nontrivial 
SESP, Okun's Law is likely to be repealed. The reduction in the Okun unemployment 
multiplier associated with SESP is evidence that the policy is having the effects for which 
it is designed-increasing potential GNP and redistributing the costs of unemployment. 
However, these effects do not come at zero cost. The SESP is not easy to 
administer. A marginal stock variety of SESP tends to favor new and fast-growing firms 
and regions. In addition, SESP may increase labor turnover, especially if it is temporary 
or of the recruitment variety. Finally, SESP with narrowly defined target groups (for 
example, low-income youth or welfare recipients) may result in the displacement of 
equally disadvantaged workers who may have more central positions in family units. 
IV 
None of these impacts of SESP will materialize if firms fail to change their 
behavior in response to the subsidy. In some past programs (for example, WIN and 
JOBS), that response was not substantial (see Daniel Hamermesh). Administrative costs 
or the low-productivity signaling effect of the subsidy apparently weakened the 
employment incentive for which the programs were designed. 
The NJTC has been in operation for more than a year. While a definitive 
assessment of its effect on employment and prices is not yet possible, a preliminary 
evaluation can be made. In theory, the NJTC should provide a major stimulus to 
employment, as firms which typically hire part-time or part-year workers will find that 
the labor costs of an expansion are cut nearly in half. The $100,000 per firm limit on the 
subsidy suggests that small and medium sized firms will experience the largest 
employment incentive. 
Nonseasonally adjusted monthly data on employment and man-hours in 
construction and retailing were regressed on seasonal dummies, trends on the seasonal 
dummies, and three-year distributed lags of input prices (gross employer wages, W; 
wholesale price of construction materials, M, or consumer finished goods, P; materials, 
services, and energy prices, Q; gasoline and electricity prices, G; and a rental price of 
capital, R). The lag structures were freely estimated, with each input price or price ratio 
being represented by its contemporaneous value, and that of each of the previous four 
quarters and four half-years. Exogeneity tests which entered future values of the wage 
rate into the equation tended to confirm the hypothesis that wage and man-hours are 
simultaneously determined. Consequently, all models were estimated using two-stage 
least squares. 
The NJTC variable is an average over the past six months of the proportion of 
firms (weighted by employees) that had knowledge of the credit. It has a value of .057 in 
June 1977 and rises at an average rate of .0424 per month, reaching .343 in January 1978 
and .572 in June 1978. 
All of the NJTC coefficients are positive and significant in Models I and II, where 
input prices enter as ratios (see Table 1). When input prices enter nominally (Models III 
and IV), the coefficients are smaller and insignificant. Across all of the regressions the 
(point) average NJTC employment stimulus over the mid-1977 to mid-1978 period 
ranges from 150,000-670,000. For these industries, actual total employment growth over 
the period was 1.3 million. The Model III and IV estimates attribute at least 20-30 
percent of the observed employment increase in these industries to NJTC. These results 
are consistent with the observation that between 1977II and 1978II rates of employment 
growth have substantially exceeded rates of output growth in both construction and 
retailing. In construction, employment grew at an 8.2-9.9 percent rate-double the 4.5 
percent growth rate of real construction output. Even in retailing, where cyclical changes 
in employment are small, the 3.0 percent growth of real sales lagged behind the 3.4-4.0 
percent growth of employment. The contrast between construction man-hours and 
employment regressions also suggests that the NJTC has, as predicted, caused a reduction 
in average hours per week (see Bishop, 1978). 
To test the relationship between prices and subsidy-induced marginal cost 
reductions, the monthly change in retail price was regressed on current and lagged 
changes in a number of industry cost variables (wages, wholesale product prices, 
materials, services, and energy prices, a rental price of capital, and excise taxes), the 
unemployment rate, and the level and trends in seasonal dummies. For nonfood 
commodities and restaurant meals the retail trade margin is negatively and significantly 
related to the NJTC variable (see Table 2). Between May 1977 and June 1978, retail 
nonfood commodity prices rose 4.73 percent, while the counterpart wholesale prices rose 
6.56 percent. This discrepancy of 1.83 percentage points approximates the preferred 
NJTC estimated effect of 2.2 percent (.038 - .572 * 100) (col. 1). The observed decline in 
the margin is particularly surprising given recent increases in the relative price of 
imported consumer goods. (Imported products, it should be noted, are included in retail 
but not wholesale price indexes.) 
TABLE 1—IMPACT OF THE NJTC ON EMPLOYMENT 
IN CONSTRUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION 
Sample—1952-78:06 
Employment 
Wholesale and Retail 
Household Data 
Retail 
Establishment Data 
Construction 
Household Data 
Construction 
Establishment Data 
Man-Hours 
Construction 
Establishment Data 
I 
.076b 
(.048) 
.0121 
.045c 
(.019) 
.0044 
.196c 
(.079) 
.0336 
.180c 
(.053) 
.0175 
.110 
(.078) 
.0340 
Average TV/7C-Induced Employment A in 
period preceeding June 1978 
Household Data 
Establishment Data 
(in thousands) 
669 
412 
Coefficient on NJTC under 
Alternative Specifications" 
II 
.101c 
(.050) 
.0119 
.047c 
(.020) 
.0045 
12-month 
575 
203 
III 
.064 
(.059) 
.0121 
.030 
(.023) 
.0044 
.166 
(.108) 
.0297 
.020 
(.108) 
.0155 
.025 
(.108) 
.0302 
565 
154 
IV 
.061 
(.044) 
.0122 
.031 
(.020) 
.0050 
.052 
(.102) 
.0353 
.052 
(.102) 
.0173 
.007 
(.091) 
.032 
410 
255 
Source: See Bishop (1978). 
"Estimated with two-stage least squares. The standard error of the coefficient is shown 
in parentheses, and the standard error of the estimate in italics beneath the coefficient. 
Model I: E = (30 • NJTC 4- (3{X 4- (32(W/P) 4- (33(R/P) 4- (34(Q/P) for retailing and 
E = f30- NJTC 4- fax 4- ft( W/M) 4- 03(R/Af) for construction where X is the vector of 
output lags, seasonal dummies and trends. Model II: Adds (3S {G/P) to Model I. Model 
III: Enters W, R, Q, M, and P nominally, rather than as ratios. Model IV: Same as III, 
but with distributed lags limited to 1.5 rather than three years. 
Significant at .05 level on a one-tail test. 
"Significant at .025 level on a one-tail test. 
TABLE 2—IMPACT OF THE NJTC ON THE MARGIN 
BETWEEN RETAIL AND WHOLESALE PRICES 
CPI Component 
Food Away from Home 
Nonfood Commodities 
Food at Home 
All Commodities 
Coefficient < 
Alternative 
3n NJTC under 
Specifications3 
One-Year Distributed Lag 
Trends on 
with Q 
- .036 c 
(-013) 
.0017 
- .038 c 
(-015) 
.0020 
.051 
(.039) 
.0053 
- .018 
(.016) 
.0022 
Reduction in Consumer Costs between 
June 1977 and June 1978 (in 
All Commodity Regression 
Disaggregated Regressions 
billions) 
3.4 
2.8 
Seasonals 
without Q 
- .037 c 
(.012) 
.0017 
- .038 c 
(.015) 
.0021 
.041 
(.038) 
.0053 
- .019 
(.016) 
.0022 
3.6 
3.3 
No Trends 
with Q 
- .032 c 
(.013) 
.0017 
- . 0 3 1 b 
(.016) 
.0022 
.051 
(.040) 
.0052 
- . 013 
(.017) 
.0023 
2.4 
1.9 
Six-Month 
Lag 
Trends 
with Q 
- . 033 c 
(.013) 
.0018 
- .038 c 
(.015) 
.0020 
.051 
(.038) 
.0052 
- .018 
(.016) 
.0022 
3.4 
2.8 
Source: See Bishop (1978). 
aThe standard error of the coefficient is shown in parentheses and the regression is 
shown in italics beneath the coefficient. Models estimated on monthly data 1953:03 to 
1978:06. Weights for Q are based on the 1967 input-output table, which includes gasoline, 
electricity, telephones, containers, cellophane packaging, supplies, insurance, auto repair, 
and legal fees. 
Significant at .05 level on a one-tail test. 
Significant at .025 level on a one-tail test. 
Among the subsectors, the pattern of coefficients is consistent with expectations. 
The large negative coefficients for the low-skill-intensive restaurant industry suggest that 
the 8-12 percent induced reduction in marginal costs caused a 1.1 percent decline in 
output price. On the other hand, the small margin, nonwage-intensive retail food industry 
has a nonsignificant positive coefficient, reflecting the greater contribution of incremental 
employment in this sector to quality than to the volume of output. 
The final rows of the table indicate that the reduction of consumer costs 
attributable to the NJTC ranges from $1.9-3.6 billion. By comparison, it is predicted that 
over its two-year life, NJTC credit claims will be $3-6 billion. 
These estimates of the impact of NJTC are for those sectors with the largest 
expected response. While across-industry displacements might offset these impacts, there 
is no clear reason why this would occur. While limited awareness of NJTC may have 
reduced its measured effectiveness, its temporary character may have led to inventory 
accumulation which a more permanent program would not induce. 
No impact estimates based on only the first year of program experience can be 
conclusive. Perhaps the NJTC variable is capturing other exogenous forces inducing 
contemporaneous employment increases and price decreases, in which case improved 
specifications may reduce the estimated NJTC impacts. While a number of possibilities 
have been tried (for example, varying lags, trend shifts in 1974, and the addition of an 
energy price variable) without significant effects on the NJTC variable, other factors may 
be at work. Hence, the finding that NJTC has had sizable employment and price effects 
must remain tentative. It should be noted, however, that the procedure employed is more 
robust with respect to assumptions on the impact of taxation changes than those used to 
estimate the response of investment spending to taxation changes. 
V 
In sum, the case for SESP is a strong one. The level of employment is likely to be 
increased, its composition improved, NAIRU reduced, and the associated price increase 
lower with SESP than with an equivalent general stimulus to aggregate demand. And the 
(at least temporary) reduction in the Okun multiplier is evidence that SESP is inducing 
the behavior for which it was designed. The results from the NJTC regressions suggest 
that such employer hiring and price responses do occur. However, these responses are for 
a nontargeted program; extrapolation of them to a targeted SESP would be inconsistent 
with evaluations of previous such programs. 
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